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The interplay between banks and the macroeconomy is of key importance for financial and 
economic stability. We analyze this link using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive 
model (FAVAR) which extends a standard VAR for the U.S. macroeconomy. The model 
includes GDP growth, inflation, the Federal Funds rate, house price inflation, and a set of 
factors summarizing conditions in the banking sector. We use data of more than 1,500 
commercial banks from the U.S. call reports to address the following questions. How are 
macroeconomic shocks transmitted to bank risk and other banking variables? What are the 
sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences in individual banks’ responses 
to macroeconomic shocks? Our paper has two main findings: (i) Average bank risk declines, 
and average bank lending increases following expansionary shocks. (ii) The heterogeneity of 
banks is characterized by idiosyncratic shocks and the asymmetric transmission of common 
shocks. Risk of about 1/3 of all banks rises in response to a monetary loosening. The lending 
response of small, illiquid, and domestic banks is relatively large, and risk of banks with a 
low degree of capitalization and a high exposure to real estate loans decreases relatively 
strongly after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Also, lending of larger banks increases 
less while risk of riskier and domestic banks reacts more in response to house price shocks. 
JEL-Code: E44, G21. 
Keywords: FAVAR, bank risk, macro-finance linkages, monetary policy, microeconomic 
adjustment. 
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1 Motivation 
How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to bank risk and other banking variables? What 
are the sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences in individual banks’ 
responses to macroeconomic shocks? We provide answers to these questions by analyzing the 
exposure of banks to macroeconomic developments in the U.S. over the period 1985-2008.  
Our analysis is based on a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) in the 
tradition of Bernanke et al. (2005) which extends a standard macroeconomic VAR 
comprising GDP growth, inflation, house price inflation, and the monetary policy interest rate 
with a set of factors summarizing a large amount of information from bank-level data. Our 
bank-level dataset contains bank risk which is our focus. We also include bank capitalization, 
profitability, and loans as bank-level variables which affect the transmission mechanism of 
macroeconomics shocks on risk. Data for a balanced panel of about 1,500 banks are taken 
from the U.S. call reports. We decompose the banking data into common and idiosyncratic 
components. A set of macroeconomic (supply, demand, monetary policy and house price) 
shocks is identified and, based on an impulse response analysis, their transmission through 
the banking system is assessed. We look at the effects of the shocks not only on aggregate 
bank variables, but we also on individual banks. Using cross-sectional regressions, we study 
which bank-level features can explain differences in banks’ responses to macroeconomic 
shocks. 
Our main findings are as follows. (i) Average bank lending increases following expansionary 
shocks. Average bank risk declines after most expansionary macroeconomic shocks. House 
price and monetary policy shocks are particularly important for bank risk. (ii) There is a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks both in terms of idiosyncratic shocks and the 
asymmetric transmission of common (banking and macroeconomic) shocks. While average 
risk declines, risk of a sizeable fraction of banks rises in response to expansionary shocks. 
The degree of capitalization, the exposure to real estate loans, the riskiness and the presence 
of foreign affiliates matter for individual banks’ risk responses. 
Our study is related to theoretical and empirical work on the effects of macroeconomic 
(mostly monetary policy) developments on bank risk. Financial accelerator mechanisms 
imply that changes in interest rates may have countervailing effects on bank risk. On the one 
hand, lower interest rates reduce the interest rate burden for firms, lower the risk of 
outstanding flexible loan contracts, thereby increasing the probability of repayment and the 
value of the underlying collateral. On the other hand, the borrowing capacity of high-risk 
firms increases with the value of pledgeable assets. Also, banks might engage in riskier, high 
yield, projects to offset the negative effects of lower interest rates on profits. Risk might 
increase. Conversely, higher interest rates increase the agency costs of lending, banks reduce  
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the amount of credit to monitoring-intensive firms, and they invest more in safe assets 
(“flight-to-quality”) (Bernanke et al. 1996, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006, Matsuyama 
2007).  
While the original financial accelerator models do not assign a specific role to banks, recent 
macroeconomic models explicitly analyze the feedback between banks and the 
macroeconomy in the context of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
(Angeloni and Faia 2009, Dib 2010, Gerali et al. 2010, Meh and Moran 2010, Zhang 2009).
1 
In these models, the impact of expansionary shocks on bank lending is unequivocally 
positive, but the impact on bank risk is less clear cut (Appendix 1 and Table A.1). In 
Angeloni and Faia (2009), for instance, a declining interest rate, following a positive supply 
or monetary policy shock, reduces banks’ funding costs and increases the probability to repay 
depositors. To maximize profits, banks optimally choose to increase leverage. But the decline 
in interest rates also lowers banks’ return on assets and this, together with higher leverage, 
increases bank risk. In Zhang (2009), on the contrary, expectations of future outcomes play a 
central role. A positive technology shock, for instance, increases the return on capital above 
its expected value which in turn corresponds to a lower than expected loan default rate. The 
bank thus realizes unexpected profits on its loan portfolio. Bank capital is accumulated 
through these earnings, strengthening banks’ balance sheet positions and reducing risk.   
A small set of empirical papers looks at the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank risk, 
with ambiguous findings. A few recent papers analyze the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy and investigate whether low policy interest rates encourage lending to high-risk 
borrowers (Rajan 2005, Borio and Zhu 2008). Empirical studies based on bank-level data find 
evidence that lower interest rates increase bank risk (Altunbas et al. 2009, Gambacorta 2009, 
Ioannidou et al. 2009, Jiménez et al. 2007).
2 Based on time series evidence for the U.S., 
Eickmeier and Hofmann (2010) and Angeloni et al. (2010) find a decline of various credit 
risk spreads and an increase of bank balance sheet risk, respectively, following a positive 
monetary policy shock. Using a model that captures the feedback between bank-level distress 
and the macroeconomy, De Graeve et al. (2008), in contrast, find a decline in German banks’ 
                                                 
1 These models differ with regard to the financial frictions (demand- versus supply-side), the assumptions on the 
degree of competition in the banking sector, the modeling of bank risk, the stickiness of interest rates, and the 
types of macroeconomic shocks. 
2 The risk-taking channel focuses on the incentives to engage in ex ante riskier projects. We instead measure 
changes in bank risk ex post. Our data do not allow isolating changes in the structure of the existing portfolios of 
banks and the structure of new lending (Jiménez et al. 2007). Also, we do not control for the duration of a 
particular monetary policy stance but consider “average” shocks over the entire sample period (Altunbas et al. 
2009). For these reasons, our results are not directly comparable with results for the risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy.  
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probability of distress after a monetary policy loosening. The impact of other shocks has, to 
the best of our knowledge, so far not been subject to careful empirical investigation.
3  
Our modeling approach implicitly accounts for the key mechanisms stressed in the theoretical 
papers and provides empirical evidence on the net effect of macroeconomic shocks on bank 
risk.  
Our main research question, the exposure of banks to macroeconomic factors, also features 
prominently in recent proposals for regulatory reforms (Basel Committee 2009). Rochet 
(2008) suggests on the basis of a theoretical model that banks should face a capital 
requirement and a deposit insurance premium that increases with their exposure to 
macroeconomic factors. Farhi and Tirole (2009) analyze the incentives of banks to coordinate 
their exposure to macroeconomic shocks, and they argue that banks which react more to 
macroeconomic factors should be regulated more tightly. Gersbach and Hahn (2009) propose 
a regulatory framework under which a banks’ required level of equity capital depends on the 
equity capital of its peers and, in this sense, on the macroeconomic environment. 
Implementing these proposals requires information about individual banks’ exposures to 
macroeconomic factors. Our results inform this debate. 
We make several contributions. First, the FAVAR model allows analyzing the dynamic 
interaction between bank-specific and macroeconomic developments in a flexible way. 
Several VAR-studies allow for the interaction between credit and macroeconomic factors 
(e.g. Ciccarelli et al. 2009, Eickmeier et al. 2009), but these studies do not focus on bank risk 
or bank-specific effects. Bank-level studies on the risk-taking or bank lending channel, in 
contrast, allow macroeconomic factors to affect bank risk, but macroeconomic factors are not 
modeled as a function of banking variables. Our setup accounts for the endogeneity of both, 
macroeconomic- and banking factors. 
Second, the FAVAR allows including lots of bank-level data. The factor model exploits the 
comovement between individual banks and allows us to model linkages between individual 
banks, i.e. through the interbank market or the exposure to common shocks. The need to 
account for linkages between financial institutions is one key lesson of the recent crisis 
(Brunnermeier 2008, IMF 2009). Moreover, we model the interaction between different 
banking variables, including the risk and the return of banks, and thus accounting for the fact 
that, in “search for yield”, banks may increase risk (Hellwig 2008, Rajan 2005). Another 
important implication of the fact that we can include lots of bank-level data in our model is 
that we can assess the exposure of each individual bank to macroeconomic shocks.   
                                                 
3 Altunbas et al. (2009) find that higher GDP growth lowers bank risk but changes in asset prices have no clear-
cut impact in risk. The analysis of these factors in risk is, however, not the focus of their paper. Moreover, the 
authors do not identify structural (real or asset price) shocks.   
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Third, previous papers analyzing the bank lending channel or the risk-taking channel regress 
bank-level lending or risk on the monetary policy interest rate, GDP growth, or asset prices 
(e.g. Altunbas et al. 2009, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008, Ioannidou et al. 2009, Jiménez et al. 
2007, Kashyap and Stein 2000).
4 The macroeconomic indicators are reduced-form constructs, 
and their developments may reflect the pass-through of different types of shocks. Instead, we 
consider identified orthogonal macroeconomic shocks which allow us to better disentangle 
the common drivers of banking developments.  
Fourth, FAVAR models have previously been fitted to large macroeconomic datasets (e.g. 
Bernanke et al. 2005, Boivin and Giannoni 2008) or aggregate financial datasets (e.g. De 
Nicoló and Lucchetta 2010, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2010). The methodology, however, 
allows exploiting even richer information, and its application also to micro-level data is the 
natural next step. We will show that omitting bank-level information might bias estimates of 
impulse responses and shocks series. Our study is one of the first using a FAVAR model 
linked to a micro-level dataset. It is closely related to Dave et al. (2009) who use a similar 
modeling approach for U.S. data but focus on the bank lending channel while our focus is on 
risk.
5 
In Sections 2 and 3, we present the data and the FAVAR methodology, respectively. In 
Section 4, we provide and discuss the empirical results and conclude in Section 5. 
2 The  Data 
The key feature of our empirical model is the joint analysis of macroeconomic data and bank-
level data, which we describe in this section. We also compare our risk measure to alternative 
risk measures used in the literature and address potential concerns regarding the presence of a 
factor structure in the data. 
2.1  Macroeconomic Data 
Our set of macroeconomic variables comprises log differences of real GDP, the GDP deflator, 
real house prices, and the level of the effective Federal Funds rate. Real house prices are 
measured as the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage house price, divided by the GDP 
deflator. The data are retrieved from FreeLunch.com, a free internet service provided by 
Moody’s Economy.com.  
                                                 
4 These papers on risk-taking address the issue that monetary policy is endogenous by either approximating 
monetary policy of the countries studied by foreign policy rates (Jiménez et al. 2007) or by Taylor rule gaps, i.e. 
deviations of the policy rate from the rate implied by the Taylor rule (Altunbas et al. 2009). 
5 Other papers combining factor models and micro-level data (with a different focus) are Den Reijer (2007) and 
Otrok and Pourpourides (2008).   
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2.2  Bank-Level Data  
Our source for bank-level data is the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (call 
reports) that all insured commercial banks in the United States submit to the Federal Reserve 
each quarter. A complete description of all variables is provided in Appendix 3. From the call 
reports, we compile a dataset consisting of quarterly income statements and balance sheet 
data over the period 1985Q1–2008Q2, i.e. our analysis does not include the period following 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. (See Frankel and Saravelos (2010) for a similar 
definition of the pre-crisis period.) Using instead information up to the beginning of the Great 
Recession in the fourth quarter of 2007 does not qualitatively change our main results.  
We consider the following banking variables. Bank risk is measured using the share of non-
performing loans in total loans. The (unweighted) ratio of equity capital to total assets is used 
as a measure of bank balance sheet strength. Our measure of banks’ profitability is return on 
assets, defined as net income to total assets. Finally, we include (growth of) total bank loans.  
2.2.1  Balancing the Panel, Correcting for Outliers, and Preparing the Data for the Factor 
Analysis 
Following previous micro banking studies, we apply a number of screens to exclude 
implausible and unreliable observations. We exclude observations with (i) negative or 
missing values for total assets, (ii) negative total loans, (iii) loan-to-assets ratios larger than 
one, or (iv) capital-to-assets ratios larger than one. In addition, entire banks with gross total 
assets below $25 million and banks engaged in a merger are dropped from the sample.
6 
Finally, if one of the three ratios (non-performing loans-to-total loans, capital-to-assets, and 
net income-to-assets) of an individual bank falls in the bottom or top percentile at any point in 
time, the entire bank is dropped. We only include banks which are in business during the 
entire period under study. Overall, these corrections reduce the sample from 13,375 banks in 
the unbalanced panel to 1,512 banks in the balanced panel. Figure 1 shows that balancing has 
not much changed the distribution of the data.  
The bank-level data are treated in the usual manner for factor analysis. All series are 
seasonally adjusted, and they enter the dataset as stationary variables. Because loans are 
assumed to be integrated of order 1, we include them as log differences in our model. The 
balance sheet ratios can be considered stationary, hence there is no need to difference them. 
The stationary series are then demeaned, and structural breaks in the means are accounted 
for.
7 Moreover, the series are standardized to have unit variance, and outliers are removed. 
                                                 
6 Berger and Bouwmann (2009) state that banks with total assets below $25 millions are not likely to be viable 
commercial banks.  
7 Some ratios do not seem to revert to a constant mean. This is possibly due to regulatory changes which led to 
an adjustment in capital ratios and other banking variables. To account for these changes, we detect breakpoints 
by applying the sequential multiple breakpoint test of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) (and the Gauss routines  
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Outliers are defined as observations with absolute median deviations larger than six times the 
interquartile range. They are replaced by the median value of the preceding five observations 
(Stock and Watson 2005).  
2.2.2  Measuring Bank Risk 
The non-performing loans ratio is our main measure of bank risk. It captures the asset risk of 
banks and thus the share of bank loans that are actually in default. This measure is available 
for a large number of banks for a long time period. Another advantage is that it is not much 
affected by changes in accounting standards. Also, it matches up with theoretical models that 
describe banks as intermediaries between depositor and lenders and that consider loan 
defaults as the main source of instabilities in banking (e.g. Boyd and De Nicoló 2005, 
Martínez-Miera and Repullo 2010, Zhang 2009). 
Alternative measures of bank risk have been used in the literature as well (see, e.g. Beck 2008 
for a survey), and Figure 2 shows how they are related to the non-performing loans ratio. The 
z-score measure is calculated using information on banks’ level of equity, the standard 
deviation of profits, and profits. Loosely speaking, the z-score is inversely related to the 
probability that the bank’s equity base is eroded, e.g. higher values indicate less risk. 
Although the focus of this risk measure differs from the non-performing loans ratio, the z-
score for the U.S. banking system tracks the median non-performing loans ratio quite well 
(Figure 2a). The disadvantage of the z-score is that it requires calculating the volatility of 
profits over a certain time window, the choice of which is somewhat arbitrary.
8 Figure 2a also 
reveals that the non-performing loans ratio is highly correlated with the cross-section 
dispersion of individual banks’ return on assets. This measure is the banks’ counterpart of the 
cross-section dispersion of firms’ earnings which has been used in the literature to capture 
uncertainty or risk in the business sector (as, e.g., discussed in Bloom 2009).  
Finally, we have checked how more market-based measures of bank risk are related with the 
median non-performing loans ratio (see Figure 2b). We have used CDS spreads obtained 
from Bloomberg, EDFs from Moody’s KMV, and stock market volatility (source: Goldman 
Sachs).
9 One disadvantage of these measures is that they are not available for the full sample 
period or for all banks. CDS spreads and EDFs trace the non-performing loans ratio 
reasonably well. These market-based measures, however, tend to peak in times of financial 
market stress. The non-performing loans ratio, in contrast, shows a much smoother pattern 
and arguably tracks fundamental risk of banks in a more reliable way.  
                                                                                                                                                        
provided by Pierre Perron on his webpage) to all series of our (stationary) dataset, and we subtract the (possibly 
shifted) means from the series (see Eickmeier 2009 for a similar treatment of (macroeconomic) data in a factor 
modelling setup). When we, instead, linearly detrend the series, the results are basically unaffected. 
8 Related to this, the z-score, as it is shown in Figure 2, by construction, lags the non-performing loans ratio. 
9 We thank Yener Altunbas and David Marqués Ibañez for their help with the EDF series.  
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2.2.3  Is There a Factor Structure in the Data? 
Exploiting a rich amount of (bank-level) information can be beneficial in a factor analysis. 
Our factor model, however, also needs to provide a good description of the data. For this to 
be the case, there needs to be a factor structure among the series included, or, put differently, 
factors can be accurately estimated only if the series strongly co-move (Boivin and Ng 2006). 
This issue is particularly relevant for microeconomic data as opposed to (aggregate) 
macroeconomic data to which factor models have been previously employed and which tend 
to exhibit a greater comovement.  
We first assess to what extent the different banking variables (risk, capitalization, return, 
lending) are correlated. Table 1 shows that the medians are highly correlated. The non-
performing loans ratio and capitalization are particularly strongly (negatively) correlated 
because a decline in asset quality forces banks to write down assets. The correlation is, 
however, not perfect. Unlike the non-performing loans ratio, capitalization is also determined 
by regulatory requirements. Moreover, banks use it as a signaling devise and might avoid 
adjustments in response to negative macroeconomic shocks. 
We next examine to what extent individual banks are related. Table 2 shows the variance 
shares explained by the first 15 principal components extracted separately from bank-level 
datasets associated with each of the four variables. There is reasonably strong comovement 
among banks for all banking variables with 6 factors explaining at least 40 percent and 9 
factors explaining at least 50 percent of the variation in the ratios. The comovement is a bit 
lower for loan growth where 7 and 12 factors are needed to explain 40 and 50 percent, 
respectively.  
We have carried out further robustness checks. We have first removed cross-sectional outliers 
from the dataset, i.e. we have dropped banks from the sample with absolute median 
deviations larger than six times the interquartile range (on average over the sample period).
10 
We have also downweighted each bank-level series by the inverse of the standard deviation 
of its idiosyncratic component (weighted principal components, see Boivin and Ng 2006). 
Finally, we have aggregated the balance sheets of all banks that belong to the same bank 
holding company. This alternative dataset contains 560 bank holding companies, and we   
have extracted factors from this dataset. Bank holding companies may be able to shift 
resources among the banks they control (Kashap and Stein 2000), and we would expect the 
comovement between bank holding companies to be larger than between individual banks. 
The factors extracted from our original dataset and the factors estimated in these robustness 
checks are very highly correlated. The trace R² from a regression of the principal components 
                                                 
10 This procedure identifies about 300 series as outliers.   
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extracted from the original dataset on the principal components estimated from the modified 
datasets lie between 0.95 and 0.99.
11  
As a final check, we have assessed whether omission of regional banking factors affect our 
estimation of the national factors. We have separately extracted factors from the bank-level 
data by state using principal components. We have then pooled the state-level factors and 
estimated national factors from the pooled dataset (see, e.g., Del Negro and Otrok 2007, Kose 
et al. 2003, Mönch et al. 2009, Beck et al. 2009 for alternative approaches).
12 The trace R² 
from a regression of the principal components extracted from the entire dataset on the 
principal components extracted from the set of state-level factors is, again, very high (0.99). 
Hence, neglecting regional factors does not seem to affect our nation-wide factor estimation. 
3  The FAVAR Methodology 
With the bank-level variables at hand, we next describe how we use this information to model 
the dynamic feedback effects between U.S. banks and the macroeconomy. We start from a 
small-scale macroeconomic VAR model which includes GDP growth ( t y Δ ), GDP deflator 
inflation ( t p Δ ), the Federal Funds rate ( t ffr ), and real house price inflation  t hp Δ as 
endogenous variables. These variable are summarized in an  (4 )1 M = × -dimensional vector 
[ ] tt t t t G y ph p ffr =Δ Δ Δ . GDP growth, inflation, and interest rates represent the standard 
block of variables included in macroeconomic VARs (e.g. Christiano et al. 1996, Peersman 
2005); fewer studies also include house prices in such a VAR (Bjørnland and Jacobsen 2008, 
Jarociński and Smets 2008). We include house prices not only because they may be relevant 
for the macroeconomy but also because they reflect the value of assets that can potentially 
serve as collateral for bank lending.  
We augment the vector Gt with a set of r  “banking factors” Bt which yields the  1 rM +× -
dimensional vector  [ ] FG ' B ' ' = tt t . The vector of banking factors  [ ] 1 B' = " tt r t bb  is 
unobserved and needs to be estimated.  
We model the joint dynamics of macroeconomic variables and banking factors as a VAR( p ) 
process: 
 A( )F c Pw = + tt L , (1) 
                                                 
11 The comparison is based on the first 6 principal components because 6 latent factors are also used in our 
analysis below. Below, we will explain this choice of the number of factors. 
12 More precisely, of the 50 states in the U.S. we consider only the states with at least 10 banks (which would 
result in at least 40 series per state). This leaves us with 40 states. We estimate the state-level factors as the first 
6 principal components from bank-level data for each of the 40 states. We pool the estimated state-level factors, 
extract the first 6 principal components from the 240 (= 6μ40) state-level factors, and compare them with the 
first 6 principal components estimated from the entire dataset.  
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where  1 A( ) A ... A
p
p LI L L =− −−  is a lag polynomial of finite order  p ,  c comprises 
deterministic terms,
13 and wt  is a vector of structural shocks which can be recovered by 
imposing restrictions on P .  
Let the elements of F t  be the common factors driving the  1 × N  vector Xt  which summarize 
our four banking variables (loan growth, the non-performing loans ratio, return on assets, and 
the capital ratio) of 1,512 individual banks. To assess the impact of macroeconomic shocks 
on the “average” bank, we also include in Xt  the medians of the four banking variables.
14 
Hence, the cross-section dimension is  N = 6,052 (= 1,512×4 + 4).  
It is assumed that Xt  follows an approximate dynamic factor model (Bai and Ng 2002, Stock 
and Watson 2002): 
  X' F = Λ+ Ξ tt t , (2) 
where  [] ' 1 Nt t t ξ ξ " = Ξ  denotes a  1 × N  vector of idiosyncratic components.
15 The matrix 
of factor loadings  [ ] 1 N λ λ Λ= "  has dimensionrMN + × , , 1,..., i iN λ =  is of dimension 
1 rM +× , and rM N +< < holds. Common and idiosyncratic components are orthogonal, 
the common factors are mutually orthogonal, and idiosyncratic components can be weakly 
mutually and serially correlated in the sense of Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983). 
Equations (1) and (2) represent a FAVAR model as has been introduced by Bernanke et al. 
(2005).
16  
The model is estimated in five steps.  
First, the dimension of F t, i.e. the overall number of common factors rM + , is determined to 
be 10. These include the 4 observable macroeconomic factors and the  6 r =  latent banking 
factors. We make this choice because our main results change when the number of factors is 
lowered, but are barely affected when it is increased, and because we prefer a sparse 
parameterization. 
In the second step, we estimate Bt by removing the observed factors from the overall factor 
space. We do this with the aid of the iterative procedure proposed by Boivin and Giannoni 
(2007). We obtain an initial estimate of Bt, 
(0) ˆ Bt , as the first  6 = r  principal components of 
Xt . Then we regress Xt  on 
(0) ˆ Bt  and Gt, ending up with 
) 0 ( ˆ
G Λ , the coefficients (or factor 
                                                 
13 As the observables are not demeaned, we include constants. 
14 To save time and capacity, we will compute confidence bands only for these median variables but we will 
focus on point estimates for individual banks’ responses. Point estimates of median impulse response functions 
are very similar to point estimates of impulse response functions of the median bank. 
15 Note that F t can contain dynamic factors and lags of dynamic factors. Insofar, equation (2) is not restrictive.  
16 Bernanke et al. (2005) are interested in a monetary policy shock and include the Federal Funds rate as the 
only observable in the FAVAR. Our model most closely resembles the one used in Eickmeier and Hofmann 
(2010) which models a set of latent factors estimated from lots of non-financial sector balance sheet items and 
other financial variables.  
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loadings) that belong to Gt. We calculate 
(0) (0) ˆ XX G =− Λ 
tt G t  and estimate 
(1) ˆ Bt  as the first r  
principal components of 
(0) X 
t . This procedure is repeated until convergence,
17 and we end up 
with the estimator of Bt,  ˆ Bt . 
The latent banking factors together with the observable macroeconomic factors explain 43 
percent of the variation in the bank-level dataset which represents a reasonable degree of 
comovement between the banking variables. 
Third, a VAR(1) model is fitted to ˆ G' B'' ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ tt . The lag order of 1 is suggested by the BIC. 
Fourth, we identify macroeconomic shocks combining sign restrictions and zero 
contemporaneous restrictions, as will be explained shortly.  
In the fifth and final step, confidence bands of the impulse response functions are constructed 
using the bootstrap-after-bootstrap technique proposed by Kilian (1998). This technique 
allows removing a possible bias in the VAR coefficients which can arise due to the small 
sample size. The number of bootstrap replications equals 500. Notice that, since  T N > , we 
neglect the uncertainty involved with the factor estimation, as suggested by Bernanke et al. 
(2005).  
As regards the fourth step, the identification of macroeconomic shocks, we apply sign 
restrictions on short-run impulse response functions (e.g. Canova and De Nicoló 2003, Faust 
1998, Peersman 2005, Uhlig 2005) and contemporaneous zero restrictions. The identification 
scheme is implemented in two steps. The first step involves carrying out a Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR residuals. We impose the 
following ordering:  ˆ B tt t tt y p hp ffr Δ→ Δ→ Δ → → . We label the Cholesky residuals 
associated with the equations explaining house price inflation, the r  latent banking factors’ 
and the Federal Funds rate “house price shock”, “shocks to the banking factors” (or “banking 
shocks”) and “monetary policy shocks”, respectively. We should note that we cannot be sure 
that the shocks to the banking factors truly represent shocks that occur in the banking sector 
or “banking shocks”. They may instead also contain shocks that are not modeled explicitly, 
such as shocks to balance sheets of the non-financial private sector (which may, however, 
also be propagated through the banking system).  
The second step aims at disentangling “aggregate supply shocks” and “aggregate demand 
shocks”. It involves rotating the Cholesky residuals associated with the equations for GDP 
growth and GDP deflator inflation and imposing the following theoretically motivated sign 
restrictions. After an aggregate supply shock, GDP and the GDP deflator move in opposite 
directions whereas after an aggregate demand shock, these two variables as well as the 
                                                 
17 We define the procedure as having converged if the sum of squared residual from a regression of x , 1,..., = it iN  on 
() ˆ B
j
t  and Gt has hardly changed compared to the sum of squared residual from a regression of x , 1,..., = it iN  on  (1 ) ˆ B
− j
t  
and Gt (by no more than a small value which we shall set at 0.000001).   
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Federal Funds rate move in the same direction. The sign restrictions are imposed 
contemporaneously and on the first four lags after the shock. Results are robust with respect 
to the restricted number of lags. The identifying restrictions are summarized in Table 3, and 
in Appendix 2 we explain how we identified the shocks in more detail.  
The sign restrictions are consistent with standard theoretical models.
18 The ordering implies 
that GDP as well as aggregate and house prices do not react contemporaneously to banking 
and monetary shocks, which is fairly standard in SVAR studies. GDP and the overall price 
level react with a delay to house price movements (e.g. Jarociński and Smets 2008). 
Moreover, we allow the monetary policy instrument to respond contemporaneously to all 
shocks. By ordering the policy instrument below the banking factors, we follow most of the 
SVAR literature which models macroeconomic and banking variables together (Ciccarelli et 
al. 2009). Reasons for sluggish adjustment of the banking sector to monetary policy could be 
the need to renegotiate existing contracts or close customer relationships that banks do not 
want to interrupt. Consistent with this assumption, the empirical banking literature finds that 
interest rate spells of banks are sticky and do not react quickly to market interest rates (Berger 
and Hannan 1991). 
4 Empirical  Results 
We organize the presentation of our empirical results around our two main research 
questions.  
4.1  How are Macroeconomic Shocks Transmitted to the Banking Sector? 
4.1.1  Impulse Response Functions of Bank Risk and Other Banking Variables 
To look at how macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to macroeconomic variables we 
present in Figure 3 impulse response functions of GDP, the GDP deflator, house prices, and 
the Federal Funds rate to aggregate supply, aggregate demand, monetary policy, and house 
price shocks. We show median responses together with 68% confidence bands to shocks of 
the size of one standard deviation.  
After a supply shock, GDP rises and the GDP deflator falls permanently. The demand shock 
triggers a temporary increase in GDP, and the general price level rises permanently. The 
monetary policy rate does not change significantly after the supply shock, but it rises 
temporarily after the demand shock. An expansionary monetary policy shock leads to a 
temporary rise in economic activity (consistent with long-run real neutrality of monetary 
policy) and to a permanent rise in the GDP deflator. We do not observe a price puzzle, i.e. a 
decline of the price level after an expansionary monetary policy shock. This is reassuring 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Peersman (2005) but also the DGSE models with banks overviewed in Table A.1.  
  13
since it suggests that we have accurately identified monetary policy shocks. House price 
shocks trigger responses which are reminiscent of demand shocks: Economic activity, the 
general price level, and the monetary policy rate rise. The increase in GDP after the house 
price shock is, however, barely significant. House prices themselves react sluggishly to 
macroeconomic shocks. Their reaction roughly mirrors the reaction of the GDP deflator. 
Overall, the response of the macroeconomic variables is in line with previous evidence. 
To assess the dynamic transmission of macroeconomic shocks to the banking sector, we look 
at impulse response functions for the median bank (Figure  4). While theory provides 
consistent predictions concerning the response of bank loans and returns following 
expansionary shocks, predictions concerning the adjustment of bank risk and capital are less 
clear cut. Loans indeed increase after all expansionary shocks. It takes roughly a year before 
loans increase after monetary policy shocks (whereas they rise immediately after the other 
shocks). This pattern for monetary policy shocks has already been found in other studies (e.g. 
Christiano et al. 1996). Banks’ returns are positively correlated with the responses of the 
Federal Funds rate to macroeconomic shocks, although the magnitude and timing of the 
effects differ depending on the shock.  
Risk declines following monetary policy, demand, and house price shocks. The effects last 
between two quarters (after the demand shock) and about four years (after the monetary 
policy shock). These results are in line with the prediction in Zhang (2009) that an 
expansionary monetary policy shock increases credit supply by reducing funding cost. Ex 
post loan default rates go down which feeds back into better capitalization. The evolution of 
the capital-asset ratio mirror-images the evolution of the non-performing loan ratio in 
qualitative terms after the supply and the monetary policy shocks but not after the demand 
and the house price shocks.  
Bank risk increases in response to supply shocks. Following a positive supply shock, the 
balance sheet composition tilts towards higher leverage (a lower capital-to-asset ratio) and 
higher risk, consistent with Angeloni and Faia (2009). In their model banks’ default 
probability is determined by the distribution of the return on lending, the liquidation value of 
the projects and, indirectly, by the leverage ratio. However, a positive supply shock might 
also increase the dispersion of the return to lending if more high risk entrepreneurs enter the 
market. This increases risk in their model and would be in line with our finding.  
Our result of a decline in bank risk after expansionary monetary policy shocks is therefore 
similar to the findings by De Graeve et al. (2008) (for Germany) but not to those from other 
empirical studies such as Angeloni et al. (2010) or from the risk-taking channel literature.  
The correlation between banks’ risk and return is negative after the demand and the house 
price shocks. This would be consistent with theoretical models arguing that banks with higher 
returns (and thus presumably higher market power) engage in less risky lending than banks  
  14
with lower returns (Allen and Gale 2004, Martínez-Miera and Repullo 2008). The correlation 
between bank returns and risk after the supply and the monetary policy shocks depends on the 
horizon; it is positive at short horizons but becomes negative at medium horizons. Recent 
DSGE models have different implications on the correlation between risk and return. 
Following a monetary policy shock, this correlation is negative in Angeloni and Faia (2010) 
but positive in Meh and Moran (2010) or Zhang (2009).  
4.1.2  Variance Decompositions 
While Figure  4 provides information on the dynamic responses of (median) bank-level 
variables to macroeconomic shocks, Table 4 shows the forecast error variance decomposition 
and allows assessing the relative importance of each of these shocks. We distinguish the short 
run (the one-year forecast horizon) from the medium run (the five-year horizon). 
Macroeconomic shocks together explain 27 percent of the non-performing loans ratio, 33 
percent of the capital ratio, and 12 and 14 percent of returns on assets and loans, respectively, 
of the median bank in the short run. These numbers increase for the ratio variables by 1-8 
percentage points in the medium run and decline for loans by 2 percentage points. For risk at 
short horizons, house price shocks are most important, consistent with theoretical models that 
emphasize the role of real estate as collateral for bank loans (Goel et al. 2009). Monetary 
policy shocks play the biggest role for risk at medium horizons. Aggregate demand shocks 
account for the greatest share of the variation in loans at short horizons. At medium horizons, 
all shocks play an about equally discernible role for loans. An additional finding is that the 
idiosyncratic (variable-specific) components are about as important as common banking 
shocks for the non-performing loans and the capital ratios and they are more important for 
return on assets and loans. 
Table 4 also reveals that shocks to the latent banking factors (or “banking shocks”) are quite 
important for macroeconomic variables. These shocks explain between 22 and 35 percent of 
the forecast error variance of the macroeconomic variables in the medium run. The shares are 
largest for house prices and for the monetary policy rate. The short-term effects are smaller, 
ranging between 4 percent (GDP deflator) and 26 percent (Federal Funds rate). 
4.1.3  The Role of Bank-Level Information 
We finally assess how omitting information extracted from the micro-level banking dataset 
would bias our results. Figure  5 compares the impulse responses of the observable 
macroeconomic factors derived from our benchmark FAVAR model with impulse responses 
obtained from a VAR in which we replace the banking factors by the median values of our 
bank-balance sheet variables. The responses of GDP, the GDP deflator, and house prices 
following macroeconomic shocks are very similar in magnitude and shape in both models. 
There are, however, notable differences in the responses of the Federal Funds rate after all  
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four shocks. In particular, the VAR model without micro-level information predicts 
significantly larger and more persistent responses of the interest rate relative to our 
benchmark FAVAR model. The reason could be that monetary policy reacts to the banking 
factors (beyond its reaction to median bank variables).  
An additional finding is that monetary policy shocks identified from the VAR model with the 
median banking variables are larger than the shocks extracted from the benchmark FAVAR 
(Figure  6). This suggests that the VAR model assigns shocks originating in the banking 
market to monetary policy.
19 Figure  6 also reveals that our FAVAR model identifies a 
sequence of expansionary monetary policy shocks in 2002 and then again between 2003 and 
2006. This is consistent with the general consensus of rather loose monetary policy in this 
period (e.g. Eickmeier and Hofmann 2010, or Taylor 2009). In contrast, the VAR ignoring the 
micro-level banking data would point to contractionary monetary policy shocks between 2003 
and 2006. We have also compared a VAR with the four median banking variables with a 
VAR which includes only the four macroeconomic variables. Findings are almost identical, 
and we do not show results from the pure macroeconomic VAR here. Hence, information 
contained in the micro bank-level data seems to matter. 
 
In sum, we find that macroeconomic shocks play a non-trivial role for developments in the 
banking sector. Bank risk for the median bank falls following most expansionary 
macroeconomic shocks, and lending increases. Furthermore, the correlation between banks’ 
risk and return is negative after all shocks at medium horizons. We also find that shocks to 
the banking factors affect the macroeconomy, especially monetary policy rates and house 
prices. Results should, however, be taken with caution. Our “banking factors” ( ˆ Bt ) capture 
shocks to banks, but they could also capture shocks to other (financial) factors. We finally 
show that omitting bank-level information would bias estimated impulse response functions 
of the monetary policy rate. It would also attribute shocks originating in the banking sector 
(incorrectly) to monetary policy shocks and yield a rather implausible shape of the monetary 
policy shocks.    
4.2  What are the Sources of Heterogeneity across Banks? 
So far, we have focused on adjustments of the “median” bank following macroeconomic 
shocks. However, the rich structure of our dataset also allows analyzing bank heterogeneity. 
Bank heterogeneity has two dimensions: There may be a substantial idiosyncratic component 
in bank-level developments, but heterogeneity may also reflect that banks respond differently 
to the common shocks. Next, we analyze the importance of these sources of heterogeneity by 
                                                 
19 We omit the identified supply, demand and house price shock series since they are very similar in both 
models.   
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looking at the dispersion of the common and the idiosyncratic components of bank-level 
developments. In a final step, we will use information on bank characteristics to explain 
different adjustments to macroeconomic shocks.  
4.2.1  Idiosyncratic Shocks versus Asymmetric Transmission of Common Shocks 
Table 5 shows the dispersion of idiosyncratic and common components of individual banks’ 
risk, capitalization, profitability, and lending over the sample period. Bank heterogeneity is 
not only due to idiosyncratic shocks but also due to the asymmetric transmission of common 
shocks. For all variables but the capital ratio asymmetric transmission is more important.
20  
To visualize the transmission of common macroeconomic shocks to individual banks we 
show in Figure  7 the (5
th to 95
th quantiles of) impulse response functions of individual 
banks.
21 The graph reveals substantial heterogeneity after all macroeconomic shocks, in line 
with results by Dave et al. (2009) for the development of loans after monetary policy shocks. 
Although risk has been shown to decline for the median bank in response to a monetary 
policy loosening, Figure 7 shows that risk indeed rises for a large fraction (roughly 1/3) of 
banks.  
4.2.2  Which Bank-Level Features Affect the Exposure of Banks to Monetary Policy and 
House Price Shocks?  
In a next step, we analyze whether the impact of monetary policy and house price shocks 
differs across individual banks with different characteristics in any systematic way. We 
regress individual banks’ impulse response functions of risk and lending after two and four 
quarters on several variables which are intended to capture long-run, structural differences 
across banks. 
We focus on monetary policy and house price shocks for three main reasons: First, house 
price shocks play a prominent role in theoretical studies featuring financial accelerator 
mechanisms (i.e. Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Changes in house prices affect the collateral 
values underlying bank lending, hence banks which are more affected by information 
asymmetries or which have a business model geared towards retail lending should be affected 
more. Second, we have shown above that house price and monetary policy shocks are 
important in explaining bank-level dynamics, and in particular for bank risk adjustment. 
Third, the reaction of banks to changes in the monetary policy instrument has been the subject 
of many empirical studies allowing us to compare our results (e.g. Cetorelli and Goldberg 
2008, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004, Kashyap and Stein 2000, Kishan and Opiela 2000). 
We focus on the risk and lending responses of individual banks because risk is the main focus 
                                                 
20 We obtain the same qualitative result also using a larger dataset with a less stringent outlier correction.  
21 We show the 5
th to 95
th quantiles instead of all impulse response functions for better visibility.   
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of the paper and because the lending responses have already been analyzed in the existing 
bank lending channel literature. 
Our explanatory variables are size, internationalization, liquidity, connectedness with other 
banks via the interbank market, riskiness, capitalization, and differences in banks’ loan 
portfolio structure. (See Appendix 3 for details.) To account for the skewed size distribution 
in the banking sector and possible non-linearities in the response of banks to the shocks, we 
also include size squared. In addition, we add a full set of state dummies (unreported). Since 
the bank-level features included at this stage capture structural differences across different 
types of banks, instead of short-term adjustments patterns, they are averaged over the sample 
period. For some variables, such as risk, we allow for differences across banks both with 
regard to the cyclical adjustment as well as the long-run structural patterns. Hence, we ask, 
e.g., whether banks which are structurally riskier than other banks adjust lending and risk in 
response to macroeconomic shocks in a systematically different way compared to safer banks. 
Since the specification of the structural features of banks is somewhat arbitrary, we also 
check the robustness of our results by dropping individual regressors. In unreported 
regressions, we find that the main results are not affected. 
We estimate the model with OLS and apply heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All 
explanatory variables (except for the dummy variables) are demeaned for the regressions. The 
constant can therefore roughly be interpreted as the average effect, and the coefficient 
estimates should be interpreted relative to the constant. Since the average reaction of loans to 
monetary policy and house price shocks is positive, a negative coefficient implies a lower 
reaction. Conversely, as the average reaction of risk to monetary policy and house price 
shocks is negative, a negative coefficient implies a stronger reaction. The regression results 
are presented in Table 6. 
We expect that small banks are more affected by macroeconomic shocks than large banks 
because of lower net worth, lack of diversification, and funding difficulties (Diamond and 
Rajan 2006, Kashyap and Stein 2000). Our results confirm the findings of previous studies 
that lending by small banks increases by more than lending by large banks after expansionary 
monetary policy shocks. The impact of size levels off as banks grow large, as shown by the 
negative squared term. Size has no significant impact on the risk response to monetary policy 
shocks. The effect of size in response to a positive house price shock mirrors its effect after 
monetary policy shocks, as suggested by financial accelerator models. 
Improved access to liquidity should reduce banks’ exposure to shocks affecting funding 
conditions (Diamond and Rajan 2006). Liquidity in fact has a negative and significant impact 
on the exposure of lending to monetary policy in the short run: More liquid banks expand 
lending by less in response to a decline in policy rates than less liquid banks. This negative 
relation vanishes in the more medium run. Liquidity has no significant impact on risk 
responses or after house price shocks.  
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Next, we account for the fact that internationalization of banks could affect their exposure to 
shocks. If shocks at home and abroad are imperfectly correlated, the presence of foreign 
affiliates might activate a channel of diversification, thereby reducing the response to 
domestic shocks. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) show that internationally oriented banks have 
the potential to lay off domestic macroeconomic shocks through linkages to their foreign 
affiliates, which reduces the exposure to domestic monetary policy shocks. We find that 
internationalization reduces banks’ lending response after one year, consistent with Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2008), but it is not an important determinant in the short run. Banks possibly 
need some time to activate the internal capital market. Also, internationalization dampens the 
reaction of bank risk after a house price shock which might reflect better portfolio 
diversification of international banks.  
Closer linkages between banks, measured as banks’ exposure to the interbank market can be 
expected to increase the exposure to macroeconomic shocks (see Allen and Gale 2001). Yet, 
the degree of interconnectedness has no significant impact. 
Risk, capitalization, or the exposure to real estate and consumer loans do not affect the 
lending response of banks.
22 But these variables affect the risk response. Exposure to the real 
estate market significantly amplifies the effect of monetary policy and house price shocks 
within the first four quarters. One explanation is that, after a monetary tightening, a decline in 
inflation increases the real value of debt obligations by borrowers and limits resources 
available to borrowers (Gerali et al. 2010). Additionally, negative second round asset price 
effects reduce collateral value. Moreover, we find a significantly positive effect of the degree 
of capitalization on the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank risk and a strong negative 
influence of riskiness on the impact of house price shocks on bank risk. 
Overall, the lending response of smaller and not very liquid banks to expansionary monetary 
policy shocks is stronger than that for larger and more liquid banks. In the medium run, banks 
with foreign affiliates react less strongly to monetary policy shocks in terms of lending. Risk 
declines by more for banks highly engaged in real estate lending and for riskier banks, while 
better capitalized banks react less in terms of risk to monetary policy shocks. Moreover, 
lending of larger banks increases less in response to house prices shocks. Riskier banks react 
more to house price shocks while international banks react less in terms of risk. 
5  Summary of Results and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we use a FAVAR model to analyze feedback effects between banks and the 
macroeconomy. We focus on the heterogeneous exposure of over 1,500 U.S. banks to 
                                                 
22 This is in contrast to Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) who find that 
capitalization is an important determinant of banks ability to shield their loan portfolio from a tightening of 
monetary policy.  
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macroeconomic factors. There is no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the effect of macroeconomic shocks on bank risk, and we make several contributions to the 
literature. First, we model the dynamic interaction of macroeconomic and banking factors. 
Second, we allow for and exploit the linkages between individual banks and between 
different banking variables such as banks’ risk and return. Third, we identify orthogonal 
macroeconomic shocks to cleanly decompose banks’ common risk into its different sources, 
and we isolate these shocks from idiosyncratic risk at the bank level.  
We are now in the position to answer the questions raised at the beginning of the paper.  
(i) How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to bank risk and other banking variables?  
Macroeconomic shocks have an important impact on bank risk and on other bank-level 
variables. Average bank lending increases following expansionary shocks, consistent with an 
increased demand for loans to finance investment and working capital during boom periods or 
an increased credit supply. Average bank risk declines after expansionary macroeconomic 
shocks with the exception of supply shocks. As a by-product we find that shocks to the 
banking factors matter for the macroeconomy, especially in the medium term when they 
explain more than 20 percent of macroeconomic volatility. Their explanatory power is largest 
for the monetary policy interest rate and for house prices. Omitting bank-level information 
can alter estimates of impulse responses and monetary policy shocks. 
(ii) What are the sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences in individual 
banks’ responses to macroeconomic shocks? 
We find a substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks both in terms of idiosyncratic 
shocks and the asymmetric transmission of common (banking and macroeconomic) shocks. 
While average risk declines, risk of about 1/3 of all banks rises in response to a monetary 
loosening. We have also studied which bank-level features can explain differences in banks’ 
exposure to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Lending of small, not very liquid, and of 
domestic banks increases by more; risk of banks with a low degree of capitalization and a 
high exposure to the real estate market decreases to a relatively strong extent. As concerns the 
exposure to house price shocks we find that lending of larger banks increases less while risk 
of riskier and domestic banks reacts more after expansionary house price shocks. 
Our findings are interesting from a banking regulation perspective. The result that less liquid 
and not well capitalized banks react more to macroeconomic shocks support proposals 
requiring more capital and higher liquidity ratios if regulators are concerned that the banking 
sector acts as an accelerator of macroeconomic shocks. At the same time, we find that small 
and purely domestic banks are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. But one should 
also take into account that the systemic impact of these banks on the macroeconomy is rather 
small. Regulatory policy would therefore need to balance different criteria (the relevance of  
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an institution for systemic risk and its exposure to macroeconomic shocks) when deciding 
upon new capital or liquidity requirements.  
In terms of future research, there are three additional issues which we consider promising. 
First, it would be interesting to disentangle domestic and global macroeconomic shocks and 
to assess if internationally active banks are worse off after adverse global shocks. Second, 
non-linearities, e.g. in the reaction of banks to common (macroeconomic and banking) 
shocks, may be present in exceptional situations such as banking crises. Our model has to be 
seen as suitable to analyze macro-banking feedbacks in “normal” times, but could be 
extended to allow for non-linearities. Third, the role of shocks to large banks for 
macroeconomic dynamics would be worth examining in details. 
Overall, our analysis can be seen as a first step into the direction of jointly modeling 
dynamics of the banking sector and the macroeconomy. They suggest that these feedback 
effects are relevant for both, understanding macroeconomic dynamics as well as the behavior 
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Appendix 1: Theoretical Background on the Effects of 
Macroeconomic Shocks on Banks 
In a complete markets setting, banks should be exposed to idiosyncratic risk but they can 
write contracts insuring them against macroeconomic risks (Hellwig 1997). Yet, models 
assuming financial contracts that isolate banks from macroeconomic shocks miss important 
interactions between banks and the macroeconomy (Zhang 2009). Theoretical contributions 
explaining the exposure of banks to macroeconomic risk need to assume frictions on financial 
markets.   
Most previous work linking banks and the macroeconomy focuses on monetary policy shocks 
and the lending channel. Walsh (2003) distinguishes two aspects. According to the bank 
lending channel, policies that affect the reserves of the banking system influence the 
transmission of monetary impulses. If access to uninsured funding is limited due to financial 
frictions, banks cut their lending in response to a tighter monetary policy, and negative output 
responses are reinforced. According to the financial-accelerator mechanism, the availability 
of cash flow and the net worth of firms affect the availability of external finance. If a 
recession weakens firms’ internal resources, the volume supply of credit declines, and the 
negative effects of the downturn are aggravated. 
Recent macroeconomic models explicitly incorporate banks in DSGE models and analyze the 
feedback between banks and different macroeconomic shocks (Table A.1). Angeloni and Faia 
(2009) and Angeloni et al. (2010) analyze the impact of monetary, productivity, demand 
(fiscal policy), and asset price shocks. In their model, banks use equity and deposits to 
finance lending to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have no internal funds and require financing 
from banks as relationship lenders. Banks have special skills in redeploying assets that are 
liquidated early. Since the entrepreneurs’ project outcome depends on the realization of a 
random shock, depositors run the bank whenever they realize that the return from the project 
is insufficient to serve all depositors. The model predicts that, following a positive 
productivity shock, inflation and interest rates fall, and output increases. In the model, the 
deposit rate moves one to one with the policy rate. Therefore, a decline in the interest rate 
corresponds to a reduction in banks’ cost of funding. A reduction in the deposit rate increases 
the probability that project returns are high enough to serve all claims of depositors. 
Consequently, banks optimally choose to increase the ratio of external funding in an attempt 
to maximize return to bank capital. The decline in interest rates lowers banks’ return on assets 
and this, together with the more fragile balance sheet composition, increases bank risk. A 
similar mechanism increases bank risk after an expansionary monetary policy shock.  
Bank risk in the model by Angeloni and Faia (2009) is the probability of a bank run 
occurring, and this probability is determined by the distribution of the returns on lending, the  
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liquidation value of the projects, and indirectly on the leverage ratio. In our empirical model, 
the proxy for bank risk is the share of non-performing loans in total loans. This measure 
should be positively correlated with the definition of risk in their theoretical model.  
In Angeloni and Faia (2009), the focus is on banks’ role as liquidity providers. Zhang (2009) 
instead focuses on an interaction between credit frictions on the demand side (net worth of 
firms) and the supply side (bank capital). In her model, banks and firms share macroeconomic 
risks because banks cannot write contracts isolating them from macroeconomic risk. Instead, 
loan contracts between banks and entrepreneurs are based on the expectation of future capital 
return and expected loan default rates. A positive technology shock, for instance, increases 
the return on capital above its expected value which in turn corresponds to a loan default ratio 
lower than expected by banks. The bank thus realizes unexpected profits on its loan portfolio. 
Bank capital is accumulated through these earnings, strengthening banks’ balance sheet 
position and consequently reducing the expected probability of default.  The implications of 
this model differ from those in Angeloni and Faia (2009) since expansionary monetary or 
technology shocks lower risk. 
Meh and Moran (2010) arrive at a similar conclusion in a model featuring a double moral 
hazard problem between banks and investors (i.e. depositors), on the one hand, and banks and 
firms, on the other hand. In this model bank capital mitigates the principal-agent problem 
between banks and depositors. By investing their own net worth into entrepreneurial projects, 
banks “signal” that they monitor entrepreneurs. Therefore, higher bank capital increases 
banks’ ability to attract loanable funds. At the same time, the amount entrepreneurs can 
borrow depends on their own net worth, as in a financial accelerator model. In this model, a 
monetary easing reduces the costs of loanable funds, leading banks to rely more on external 
funding to finance lending. This leads to a reduction in the capital-asset–ratio, and bank risk 
increases.  
In the papers cited so far, changes in interest rate spreads are not modeled as a transmission 
mechanism of macroeconomic shocks because banks are assumed to operate under perfect 
competition. Gerali et al. (2010) modify this assumption by introducing monopolistic 
competition on the deposit and the lending side of banks’ business. Moreover, different types 
of transaction costs prevent banks from adjusting their interest rates and balance sheets 
instantaneously. Banks lend to entrepreneurs as well as to a group of “impatient” households 
with a high rate of time preference. While the model is very rich in terms of the structure of 
the banking system, it does not focus on the implications of the macroeconomy for bank risk, 
which is the focus of our analysis. 
In sum, theoretical literature has quite clear-cut implications with regard to the impact of 
different macroeconomic shocks on the volume of lending and the profitability of banks. 
Expansionary shocks increase lending, and the returns of banks mirror changes in interest 
rates. Implications for the impact of these shocks on bank risk and on capitalization are less  
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clear-cut. While some papers suggest a positive correlation between expansionary shocks and 
bank risk, this correlation might also be negative if a financial accelerator mechanism is at 
work and if banks “flee to quality”. 
Recent literature has also discussed the exposure of banks to macroeconomic factors as a 
determinant of systemic risks in banking. In Farhi and Tirole (2009), the probability of 
success of projects financed by banks depends on macroeconomic shocks. Banks choose the 
correlation of their portfolio risk with that of other banks. There is a strategic 
complementarity in these choices – the higher the number of banks holding similar portfolios, 
the more likely is a (monetary) bail out in case of a negative shock. Banks want to fail when 
the largest possible number of other banks is failing. One implication of the model is that a 
low (policy) interest rate increases risk because of increased bank leverage (a lower capital-


















Table A.1: Theoretical Hypotheses on the Impact of Macroeconomic Shocks on Banks 
  Angeloni/Faia (2009)  Dib (2010)  Gerali et al. (2010)  Meh/Moran (2010)  Zhang (2009) 
  Monetary 
policy  Productivity  Monetary 
policy  Technology  Monetary 
policy  Technology  Monetary 
policy  Technology  Monetary 
policy  Productivity 
M a c r o e c o n o m y            
Inflation  + - + - + - + - + - 
Interest  rates  - - - + - - - -    
Output  + + + + + + + + + + 
B a n k s             
Equity / assets  -  -  +  + (-)      -  -  +  + 
Loans  + + - + + + + +  -  (+)  + 
Return  on  assets  -  -         
Risk   +  +  -  +        -  -  -  - 
Notes: This Table summarizes the implications of the theoretical models discussed in more details in Appendix 1. The signs reported below give the impact effects, signs in 
parenthesis give the medium-run effect if different. Details on the calibration and underlying assumptions are given in the original papers. All monetary and 
productivity/technology shocks are expansionary.  
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Appendix 2: Identification of Shocks 
Suppose that  t u ˆ  is the  1 rM +×  vector of reduced-form VAR residuals where the latent and 
observable factors are the endogenous variables. The  1 rM + ×  vector of (orthogonalized) 
Cholesky residuals  t v  is estimated as  
  ˆ ˆˆ vA u
t t = , (A1) 
where  ˆ A  is the lower triangular Cholesky matrix of  ) u ˆ cov( t . We partition  ˆ vt  in two parts, 
the 2 1 ×  vector of Cholesky residuals associated with GDP growth and GDP deflator 
inflation 
1...2 ˆ vt  and the  2 1 1 rM +− + ×  vector of Cholesky residuals associated with house 




+ , and 
1...2 3... ˆˆ ˆ v=v ' v ''
rM
tt t
+ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . The estimated vector of structural shocks 
1...2 3... ˆˆ ˆ ww ' w ' '
rM
tt t
+ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  is 
related to  ˆ vt  as follows. Let 
1...2 1...2 ˆˆ w= v tt  and 
3... 3... ˆˆ w= R v
rM rM
tt
+ + where  R  is the 2 2 ×  rotation 
matrix and  2 R'R I =  and, by construction,  ˆ cov(w ) I tr M + = .  
The rotation matrix R  is chosen such that the identifying restrictions specified in the main 
text are satisfied. We follow Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010) and let Ω be an 2 2 ×  random 
matrix with each element having an independent standard normal distribution and  QR Ω=  be 
the QR decomposition of Ω.  
It turns out that more than one R  satisfy the sign restrictions. Following Fry and 
Pagan (2007) we choose out of K   R s that satisfy the sign restrictions, the R  that leads to 
impulse response functions which are as close as possible to their median values; for details 
see Fry and Pagan (2007). K  is set at 100 to keep it computationally tractable.  
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Appendix 3: Definition of Bank-Level Variables 
Variable Definition 
Consumer loans  Call report item rcfd1975 (loans to individuals for households, family, and 
other personal expenditures)  
Equity capital/assets  Ratio of equity capital - call report item rcfd3210 (total equity capital) – to 
total assets 
Interconnectedness  The degree of connectedness of banks is measured using the share of federal 
funds purchased in total assets as a proxy for the exposure to the interbank 
market (King 2008). Interbank borrowing is measured through the call report 
entry rcfd3353 (average quarterly of federal funds purchased and securities 
sold under agreements to repurchase). 
International bank  We label a bank “international” if it is affiliated with a global bank holding 
company (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008) and construct a dummy variable 
which is 1 if a bank is international and 0 otherwise. This procedure results in 
36 international active banks. Global bank holding companies’ foreign 
affiliates are identified through a positive entry in any of the call report entries 
due to foreign affiliates (rcon2941), due from foreign affiliates (rcon2163), 
total loans of foreign affiliates (rcfn2122) or C&I loans of foreign affiliates 
(rcfn1766) in one or more banks controlled by the bank holding company. 
Liquidity  Liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash holdings and total securities to total 
balance sheet. Prior to 1994Q1 our securities measure is constructed as the sum 
of the call report entries rcfd0390 (total investment securities – book value), 
rcfd2146 (total assets held in trading accounts) and rcfd1350 (federal funds 
sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell). After 1994Q1 
securities are defined as the sum of the call report entry lines rcfd1754 (held to 
maturity securities, total) rcfd1773 (available for sale securities, total)  
rcfd3545 (trading assets, total) and rcfd1350 (federal funds sold and securities 
purchased under agreements to resell).  
Nonperforming loans / total 
loans  
Share of total nonperforming loans in total loans. Total nonperforming loans is 
constructed as the sum of call report item rcfd1403 (total loans and lease 
finance receivbles: nonaccrual) and call report item rcfd1407 (total loans and 
lease finance receivbles: past due 90 days or more and still accruing).  
Real estate loans  Call report item rcfd1410 (loans secured by real estate)  
Return on assets  Ratio of net income - call report item riad4340 (net income) - to total assets. 
Size  Bank size is measured by the log of banks’ real total assets, i.e. assets divided 
by the GDP deflator. Call report item rcfd2170 (total assets, gross).   
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Table 1:  Correlation Between Median Banking Variables 
   Non-performing 
loans / total loans
Equity capital / 
assets  Return on assets  Change in loans 
Non-performing loans / loans  1.00       
Equity capital / assets  -0.89  1.00     
Return on assets  -0.34  0.41  1.00   
Change in loans  -0.30  0.28  0.40  1.00 
Notes: This table shows the correlation matrix of the median banks’ variables over the entire sample period 
1985Q1 – 2008Q2.  
  34
Table 2:  Cumulated Variance Shares Explained by the First 15 Principal Components 
Calculated from Datasets Associated with Individual Banking Variables 
   Non-performing loans / 
total loans  Equity capital / assets  Return on assets  Change in loans 
1 0.14  0.16  0.12  0.10 
2 0.21  0.27  0.20  0.17 
3 0.28  0.35  0.27  0.23 
4 0.33  0.42  0.33  0.29 
5 0.38  0.48  0.38  0.33 
6 0.43  0.52  0.42  0.37 
7 0.46  0.56  0.45  0.40 
8 0.50  0.60  0.49  0.43 
9 0.52  0.63  0.51  0.45 
10 0.55  0.65  0.53  0.47 
11 0.57  0.67  0.55  0.49 
12 0.60  0.69  0.57  0.51 
13 0.62  0.70  0.59  0.53 
14 0.63  0.72  0.61  0.54 
15 0.65  0.73  0.62  0.56 
Notes: This table shows the variance shares explained by 1 up to 15 principal components. The principal 
components are extracted from data sets corresponding to one bank level variable´. 
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Table 3:  Identifying Restrictions 
   Supply  Demand  House price  Monetary policy  Shocks to latent 
    shocks shocks shocks shocks  (banking)  factors
GDP  + + 0 0 0 
GDP  deflator  - + 0 0 0 
House price           0  0 
Federal  Funds  rate   +      
Banking  factors      0   
Notes: The sign restrictions are imposed contemporaneously and on the first four lags after the shocks. The zero 
restrictions are imposed contemporaneously.  
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Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 















    1-year  horizon    
GDP  0.57 0.28  0.01  0.00 0.09   
GDP  deflator  0.45 0.40  0.05  0.02 0.04   
House  price  0.03 0.02  0.83  0.00 0.08   
Federal  Funds  rate  0.02 0.40  0.12  0.13 0.26   
Non-performing loans / loans  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.06  0.30  0.39 
Equity capital / assets  0.07  0.18  0.04  0.04  0.28  0.36 
Return on assets  0.08  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.10  0.77 
Loans  0.05 0.06  0.03  0.00 0.09  0.74 
     5-year  horizon      
GDP  0.46 0.11  0.04  0.02 0.26   
GDP  deflator  0.36 0.22  0.03  0.05 0.22   
House  price  0.03 0.03  0.48  0.01 0.31   
Federal  Funds  rate  0.03 0.32  0.12  0.12 0.35   
Non-performing loans / loans  0.04  0.10  0.08  0.13  0.34  0.23 
Equity capital / assets  0.05  0.16  0.03  0.10  0.36  0.21 
Return on assets  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.21  0.64 
Loans  0.03 0.03  0.03  0.03 0.32  0.48 




Table 5: Dispersion of Common and Idiosyncratic Components 
   Non-performing 
loans / total loans 
Equity capital / 
assets  Return on assets  Change in loans 
Common  component  0.70 0.53 0.81 0.84 
Idiosyncratic  component  0.63 0.77 0.50 0.49 
Notes: This table shows the cross-sectional standard deviations on average over the sample period. 
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Table 6: Regression Results 
  Monetary policy shock  House price shock 
  Loans, ½ year  Loans, 1 year  Risk, ½ year  Risk, 1year  Loans, ½ year  Loans, 1 year  Risk, ½ year  Risk, 1year 
Size -0.695***  -1.243***  -0.019  -0.008 -1.476*** -2.265*** 0.053 0.092 
  (0.209)  (0.410) (0.036)  (0.024) (0.420)  (0.684) (0.086)  (0.064) 
Squared size  0.030***  0.054***  0.001  0.000  0.063***  0.097***  -0.003  -0.004 
  (0.009)  (0.017) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.018)  (0.029) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Connectedness 0.191  0.621  0.016  -0.022  -0.699  -1.287  0.004  -0.009 
  (0.452)  (0.892) (0.067)  (0.048) (0.905)  (1.351) (0.104)  (0.047) 
Liquidity -0.177*  -0.222  0.007  -0.005  0.036  0.395  0.01  -0.01 
  (0.097)  (0.187) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.197)  (0.288) (0.025)  (0.012) 
Capitalization 0.163  0.342  0.043  0.087**  -0.579  -0.687  0.09  0.016 
  (0.300)  (0.566) (0.054)  (0.037) (0.642)  (0.928) (0.087)  (0.040) 
Risk -0.181  -0.832  0.133  -0.159  -1.31 -0.814  -0.886**  -0.574*** 
  (0.964)  (1.857) (0.219)  (0.158) (2.049)  (2.879) (0.360)  (0.159) 
Consumer loans / total loans  -0.015  -0.079  -0.016  0.003  -0.108  -0.106  0.04  0.017 
  (0.108)  (0.207) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.202)  (0.290) (0.026)  (0.012) 
Real estate loans / total loans  0.096  0.121  -0.033***  -0.015*  0.185  0.231  -0.041**  0.020** 
  (0.065)  (0.126) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.138)  (0.194) (0.019)  (0.008) 
International dummy  -0.066  -0.181*  -0.011  0.000  -0.039  -0.035  0.027**  0.004 
  (0.053)  (0.109) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.093)  (0.138) (0.011)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.054  0.138*  -0.007  -0.015***  0.098  0.205*  -0.037***  -0.011* 
  (0.042)  (0.081) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.091)  (0.122) (0.014)  (0.006) 
Number of banks  1512  1512  1512  1512  1512  1512  1512  1512 
R² 0.073  0.072  0.061  0.082  0.061  0.055  0.113  0.077 
Notes: The dependent variable is the impulse response functions for the non-performing loans ratio and loans to expansionary monetary policy and house price shocks. 
Explanatory variables are demeaned bank characteristics as defined in Section 3.2. For more details, see also table Appendix 3. A full set of state dummies is included. ***, **, * 
= significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 
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Figure 1: Kernel Densities of Banking Variables – Balanced versus Unbalanced Data 




























Notes: Dashed red and solid black lines show kernel density estimates of unbalanced and balanced dataset 
respectively. The support used to estimate the kernel densities is given by the 1st and 99th percentile of the 
distribution of the unbalanced dataset. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of Measures of Bank Risk 
(a) Balance Sheet Measures 















Cross-section dispersion of return on assets
 
(b) Market-Based Measures 
















Bank stock market vola
 
Notes: The series are demeaned and standardized to have a unit variance. The z-score measure is computed as  
t t t t Assets on turn Assets on turn Ratio Capital z ) (Re ) Re ( σ − =  with the volatility of return on assets computed over a 
rolling window of 20 periods. The value of z-score at 1990Q1 is thus computed using the volatility over the 
period 1985 to 1990. The source for the EDF (1 year forecast horizon) is Moody’s KMV. The CDS spreads are 
taken from Bloomberg, bank stock market volatility is taken from Goldman Sachs.  
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions of Macroeconomic Factors 





















































































































Notes: We show the median and the one standard deviation confidence bands. In percent (GDP, the GDP deflator and house prices) and in percentage points (Federal Funds rate).   
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions of Median Banking Variables 
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Notes: We show the median and the one standard deviation confidence bands. In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios).  
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Figure 5:  Impulse Response Functions of Macroeconomic Factors from the Baseline FAVAR and a VAR Without Micro-Level 
Information 







































































































































Notes: We show the median and the one standard deviation confidence bands of the benchmark FAVAR model (black) and a standard VAR with the four median banking 
variables (red). In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios). The size of the shocks (i.e. the contemporaneous impact of supply and demand shocks on GDP, of house 
price shocks on house prices and of monetary policy shocks on the Federal Funds rate) obtained from the VAR was standardized to be the same as the size of the shocks obtained 
from the FAVAR.  
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shock Series 









Notes: Shocks estimated based on the benchmark FAVAR, i.e. the model including bank-level information, (solid black) and the VAR with the median banking variables (dashed 
red). The size of the shocks is one standard deviation.  
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions of Individual Banks (5th to 95th Quantiles) 




















































































































Notes: Point estimates of impulse response functions to one standard deviation shock. In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios). CESifo Working Paper Series 
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